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Abstract
This paper is an empirical study of the market for managers, more speci￿cally the
e⁄ects of agency, human capital, and preferences on their promotion, tenure, turnover
and compensation. From a large longitudinal data set compiled from observations on
executives and their publicly listed ￿rms, we construct a career hierarchy and report on
its main features. Our summary results motivate a dynamic competitive equilibrium
model, whose parameters we identify and estimate. Controlling for heterogeneity
amongst ￿rms, which di⁄er by size and sector, and also managers, whose backgrounds
vary by age, gender and education, our estimates are used to evaluate how important
moral hazard and job experience are in jointly determining promotion rates, turnover
and compensation.
1 Introduction
Chief executives are paid more than their subordinates, and internal promotions with the
￿rm are positively correlated with wage growth.1 Since high ranking executives are almost
always drawn from the lower ranks, usually from within the ￿rm, it is tempting to con-
clude that part of the reward from working hard in a low rank is the chance of promotion
to earn rents. Theory provides several possible explanations, ranging from human capital
acquired on lower level job, to superior ability being revealed with experience leading to
wage dispersion, or as the prize in a tournament played by lower ranked executives to
induce hard work.2 The premise of all these explanations is the commonly held opinion
that the CEO is better o⁄ than those he supervises. Yet several studies, conducted with
data on executive compensation and returns from publicly traded ￿rms, show quite con-
clusively that CEO compensation is more sensitive to the excess returns of ￿rms than the
compensation of lower ranked executives.3 Thus at the upper levels of the career ladder,
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1See Lazear (1992), Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a), McCue (1996)
2See Prendergast (1999), Gibbons and Waldman (1999) and Neal and Rosen (2000) for surveys.
3See Margiotta and Miller (2000) and Gayle and Miller (2008a, 2008b).
1di⁄erently ranked jobs do not have the same characteristics. Whether one job is more
desirable than another depends on the probability distribution of ￿nancial compensation
that generates his income, as well as its nonpecuniary costs and bene￿ts.
To the best of our knowledge, no one has attempted to quantify how much a CEO
receives as a rent from human capital in management and leadership, and how much he
is compensated for receiving a more volatile income. A small but growing literature on
the structural estimation of moral hazard models investigates the empirical relationship
between the principal￿ s return and the agent￿ s compensation, in order to quantify how
incentives are used for inducing agents to work in the interests of their principals and
truthfully revealing their hidden information.4 These studies ￿nd that estimates of the
higher risk premium necessary to compensate a CEO for a more uncertain income relative
to the second in command are of the same order of magnitude as di⁄erences in expected
compensation. Such ￿ndings do not resonate with common opinion, because they imply
the CEO receives very little pecuniary rent from his promotion to that position. Published
work does not, however, integrate human capital and its behavioral consequences into an
optimal contracting framework, confounding any attempt to gauge the degree of on-the-
job training provided at lower ranks relative to the nonpecuniary value of holding a job
at any given rank. More generally, the empirical importance of human capital in the
executive labor market, and the role of promotions in this process, is unclear.5
This paper is an empirical study of the e⁄ects of incentives, human capital, and pref-
erences of managers, with goal of explaining the di⁄erences in the promotion, tenure, job
turnover and compensation structure across managers.
We estimate a dynamic equilibrium model to analyze and disentangle the e⁄ects of
competition in the market for managers using data on internal promotions, job turnover
and the compensation of executives. Our data contain background information on execu-
tives, including age, gender, education, executive experience and the types of ￿rms they
work for, plus detailed information on their compensation and the ￿nancial returns of their
￿rms. From the large longitudinal data set compiled from observations on executives and
their publicly listed ￿rms, we de￿ne and construct a career hierarchy and report on its
main features. Our summary results motivate a dynamic competitive equilibrium model,
whose parameters we identify and estimate. Controlling for heterogeneity amongst ￿rms
and managers, our estimates are used to evaluate how important moral hazard and job
experience are in jointly determining promotion rates, turnover and compensation.
Our data is described in the next section, where we de￿ne the job hierarchy and wage
compensation. Our measure of compensation is comprehensive, and includes salary and
bonus, stock and option grants, retirement bene￿ts, as well as income directly attributable
to holding securities in the ￿rm in lieu of a widely diversi￿ed portfolio. The compensation
data is augmented with data on the titles of the executives, along with their professional
and demographic background compiled from the Marquis "Who￿ s Who" . We de￿ne a
job hierarchy as the ￿nest partition induced by a given complete and transitive preference
relation over a ￿nite set of job descriptions and population of job transitions, extending
the empirical investigation of Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994) on internal promotion
4Ferrall and Shearer (1999), Margiotta and Miller (2000), Dubois and Vukina (2005), Bajary and
Khwaja (2006), Du￿ o, Hanna, and Ryan (2007), D￿ Haultfoeviller and Fevrier (2007), Einav, Finkelstein
and Schrimpf (2007), Nekipelov (2007), Gayle and Miller (2008a,b,c).
5Frydman (2005) ￿nds evidence on the increase importance of general skills in executive compensation.
2for a single case study ￿rm with to promotion and turnover within and between all of
the roughly 2,500 ￿rms encompassing about 30,000 and 60 job descriptions. In contrast
their data, the hierarchy induced by our data very sensitive to the precise de￿nition of
the preference relation, and consequently we used a much weaker criterion for de￿ning
di⁄erences in rank than in their seminal study. We estimated a probability transition
matrix for the seven rank hierarchy we found from our sample, to determine career patterns
within and between ￿rms. Within each ￿rm a clear pattern of advancement maps out the
evolution of managerial careers independently of compensation issues, and this pattern can
be extended in a natural way to job transitions between ￿rms. We ￿nd that promotion
probability rises with tenure but the probability of ￿rm turnover declines with tenure.
Overall, tenure is positively correlated with compensation, increasing in rank, and the
portion of the compensation tied to the excess return also increases in tenure and rank.
However, tenure has a relatively small negative e⁄ect on the compensation. MBA degree
increases promotion probability, ￿rm turnover probability and compensation. We ￿nd
that executives who change ￿rms typically move to higher ranks and are more likely to
leave ￿rms with a large number of employees. Negative ￿rm performance also increases
the likelihood of executives changing ￿rms.
The equilibrium model is set up in Section 3. It is motivated by empirical regularities
we ￿nd in the data. First the compensation of the executives are sensitive to ￿ uctuations
in the abnormal returns. In fact, the ￿rm￿ s excess return (over and above the market￿ s
return) is the most important determinant of managerial compensation, suggesting the
importance of incentives and moral hazard. We ￿nd that in fact the higher the executive￿ s
rank in the ￿rm, the more sensitive his compensation to the abnormal return. We also
￿nd that ￿rm turnover is positively correlated with promotions and higher compensation.
Executives choose job, ￿rm and e⁄ort level every period. They have preferences over
jobs, particularly, e⁄ort is costly. These taste parameters vary across jobs and ￿rms.
In addition, every period managers privately observe a ￿rm-job speci￿c taste shock. The
e⁄ort level is private information as well. While working they accumulate ￿rm-speci￿c and
general human capital. We assume human capital accumulation on a job is greater when
the manager exerts e⁄ort. The rate of human capital accumulation varies across jobs and
￿rm as well, therefore, working in some ￿rms and jobs may increase the manager￿ s stock
of human capital. Firms o⁄er contracts which provide incentives for managers to exert
e⁄ort. Because exerting e⁄ort increases the manager￿ s stock of human capital, future
promotion prospects provide incentives6. Thus, variation in compensation across ￿rms
and jobs partially re￿ ect the di⁄erent opportunities to accumulate human capital and
di⁄erent promotion prospects. In addition, managers￿age and rank imply di⁄erences in
career concerns a⁄ecting the optimal compensation schemes. The markets for executives
is competitive. Managers have di⁄erent stocks of human capital and compensation adjusts
to clear the market for each skill set.7
Identi￿cation and our estimation strategy are discussed in Section 4, while some pre-
liminary estimates from the structural estimation are reported in the ￿nal section. We
6Gibbons and Murphy (1992) develop and empirically test a model of optimal contracts in the presence
of career concerns in the marhet for CEOs.
7The optimal contract decentralizes, (see conditions in Fudenberg, Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1990)
despite the private information. Although e⁄ort a⁄ects human capital contracts and labor market histories
are observed, therefore, employers know the e⁄ort level the executives exerts given the contract.
3used four metrics to assess how much agency problems in executive markets are miti-
gated by their career concerns. Two of these measure the impact of an executive shirking
rather than working, while the other two focus on the cost of eliminating the moral haz-
ard problem. We ￿nd that ￿rms are prepared to pay hardly anything to eliminate the
moral hazard problem at the lower ranks, but that at the upper levels, the risk premium
paid to executives for accepting an uncertain income stream that depends on the ￿rm￿ s
abnormal returns, are considerably greater. Career concerns greatly ameliorate the moral
hazard problem for lower level executives, but their importance declines monotonically
with promotion through the ranks. Overall our empirical ￿ndings, based on a large sam-
ple of executives employed by a broad cross section of publicly traded ￿rms, demonstrate
that the design of the hierarchy and the promotion process are important tools, used
in conjunction with compensation schemes, for disciplining employees and aligning their
interests to the goals of the organization.
2 Data
The data for our empirical study was compiled from three sources. First we extracted
annual records on 30,614 individual executives from Standard & Poor￿ s ExecuComp data-
base, itemizing their compensation and describing their title, selected because they were
one the top eight paid executives of 2,818 ￿rms in the S&P 500, Midcap, and Smallcap
indices in at least one year spanning the period 1992 to 2006. We coded the position of
each executive in any given year by one of 37 titles listed in Table 1, which formed the
basis of the hierarchy used in our empirical work and discussed in Figure 1 and Table 2.
Figure 1 describes the titles (the numbered circles in each rank) included in each rank,
with rank 1 being the highest rank in the hierarchy and rank 15 being the lowest rank.
The arrows drawn between titles describe executives transitions (promotions and demo-
tions) from title to title. For tractability reasons, we only drew an arrow if the percentage
of executive moving from title x to title y is at least 2%. Table 2 provides descriptions
of the titles in each rank. Below we de￿ne a career hierarchy, explain how and why our
particular ranking schemed was adopted, depict the relationships between the original
positions, the hierarchy and the sample transitions observed, and construct the transition
matrix between ranks to illustrate promotion and turnover patterns.
Data on the 2,818 ￿rms were supplemented by the S&P COMPUSTAT North Amer-
ica database and monthly stock price data from the Center for Securities Research (CSP)
database. We also gathered background history for a sub-sample of 16,300 executives, re-
covered by matching the 30,614 executives from our COMPUSTAT data base using their
full name, year of birth and gender with the records in Who￿ s Who, which contains bi-
ographies of about 350,000 executives. Summary statistics for the subsample are given in
Tables 3 and 4 in terms of the types of ￿rms our sample executives work for, and the ranks
they hold, by their background characteristics and job experience. The selected executives
come from larger ￿rms than those for which there is no background information, and only
1800 of the 2,818 ￿rms in our original sample contained at least one executive listed in
Who￿ s Who. The matched data gives us unprecedented access to detailed ￿rm character-
istics, including accounting and ￿nancial data, along with their managers￿characteristics,
namely the main components of their compensation, including pension, salary, bonus,
4option and stock grants plus holdings, their socio-demographic characteristics, including
age, gender, education, and a comprehensive description of their career path sequence
described by their annual transitions through the 37 possible positions.
The last part of this section reports results from multinomial logit and wage regression
analyses, to characterize the stylized facts about promotion, turnover, retirement and
compensation, conditional on an executive￿ s background and experience.
2.1 Hierarchy and Transitions
In this paper a career hierarchy is de￿ned as a rational (complete and transitive) ordering
over a set of jobs or positions. Thus a career hierarchy is any partition of jobs that does
not contain the possibility of promotion cycles, that is any job sequence of promotions
starting and ending at the same position. We follow Baker Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994),
by de￿ning the ordering on the basis of job transitions in the worker population alone,
rather than factoring in other characteristics of jobs and their respective compensations as
well. Their approach is particularly amenable to addressing life cycle issues and analyzing
human capital.
Baker et al devised the rule that if greater than one percent of all transitions from job x
were from x to job y; and more than one percent transitions from y were from y to x; then
the jobs x and y are assigned to the same rank. The predominant transition ￿ ow, which
de￿nes the direction of promotion, determined the order in which jobs and ranks are listed
in their job transition matrix, where jobs for which there are mainly out￿ ows to other jobs
in the sample being listed in the top left. Applying this rule to their data set, a case
study involving a single ￿rm with 17 positions and 69,840 employee years, yielded 8 ranks.
Their job transition matrix is (almost) upper block triangular and therefore satis￿es the
transitivity property, implying their ordering is rational for the sample population. If we
apply the same rule to our full data set, however, then only one rank emerges from our
37 de￿ned positions for the 85,748 employee years in our data if transitivity is imposed as
well. Our data set, containing both internal and external transitions across many ￿rms in
a more narrowly de￿ned labor market, does not support a (nontrivial) hierarchy if such a
stringent rule is used to characterize a rational ordering. For this reason we used a weaker
criterion to characterize the ordering, de￿ned as follows. Let x ￿ y mean there are more
transitions from y to x than x to y. Then x is ranked at least as highly as y if x ￿ y
and/or if x ￿ z ￿ ::: ￿ y: By construction this is a rational ordering. Figure 1 illustrates
the relationship between jobs, transition patterns and ranks in our data set. As Table 1
shows, this ordering supports 7 ranks.
Table 2 describes the patterns of job to job transitions within ￿rms per year, the
upper-right triangle showing promotions (yearly transitions into higher ranks) and the
lower triangle showing demotions. Its diagonal elements shows that changing rank occurs
only infrequently. Depending on rank, between about 80 percent and 95 percent remain in
their position at the end of the year. Our de￿nition of the ordering for jobs aggregates to
ranks and hence the integer in any o⁄-diagonal cell (i;j) of the transition matrix exceeds
the number in (j;i); almost without exception. Thus promotion is more common than
demotion, by construction. Thus 99 percent of Rank 2 o¢ cers remain at that level or
are promoted, that is conditional on staying in the sample. However demotion is not a
rare event, particularly in the middle levels, where demotion by one rank from Rank 4
5is more common than promotion by one rank. Promotion to an adjacent rank is almost
invariably more common than promotion to any other rank, but at lower ranks skipping a
rank is more common than being promoted to the next one. Demotions are also monotone
decreasing in rank, for example more than twice as many slipping one rank as opposed to
three.
The last two rows in the top panel of Table 2 represent the number/percent of entries
into the rank from other ranks, while the two right columns give the number/percent who
exit the rank for another one, that is conditional on remaining in the sample. The two
right columns are the number/percent of executives exiting the rank. For example, the
highest rank, Rank 1 has 33 percent of entry but only a 12 annual exit rate yearly, Rank 2
also has more entries than exits, the di⁄erences decline in the rank, but in the lower ranks,
there is more exit than entry as would be expected of entry level jobs. Our choice of the
order relation is con￿rmed by the fact that every cell has nonzero entries, and most of
the o⁄ diagonal cell numbers exceed one percent of the total number of changes, whether
measured as an exit from the rank, or an entry into it.
Executive turnover rates from one ￿rm to another are displayed in the lower panel
of Table 2. Overall, transitions that involve changing ￿rms are small relative to internal
transitions, accounting for 1.6 percent of the observations. The bottom row shows that a
substantial fraction of all ￿rm-to-￿rm transitions are into higher ranks. Taking proportions
of the bottom row elements to their corresponding rank sizes, the panel also shows that
the rate declines with rank, very few executives changing ￿rms into the lower ranks. The
row entries describe the percent of transitions from a rank as a fraction of all transitions
involving ￿rm turnover from the rank. For example, 52% of executives who moved from
Rank 1 move into the same rank in a di⁄erent ￿rm. The rest of the movers move into
lower levels in other ￿rms. External transition patterns are di⁄erent from the internal
transitions. Below Rank 2, conditional on turnover, a promotion is more likely than not,
in contrast to the top panel, where the diagonal elements are dominant. A large percent
of executives who change ￿rms in Ranks 2 and 3 move to Rank 1. Comparing external
moves into a rank with total moves into the same rank, more than one quarter of Rank
2 o¢ cers are brought in from outside (496 out of 1872), a much higher proportion than
for any other rank. Note too, from the top panel, that conditional on remaining in the
sample, Rank 2 executives have a lower hazard rate out of their job than the other ranks.
2.2 Executive and Firm Characteristics
Most of the characteristics of the executives and ￿rms in the subsample of matched
data require no (further) explanation, but the construction of several variables merit a
remark. The sample of ￿rms was initially partitioned into three industrial sectors by
GICS code. Sector 1, called primary, includes ￿rms in energy (GICS:1010), materials
(1510), industrials (2010,2020,2030), and utilities (5510). Sector 2, consumer goods, com-
prises ￿rms from consumer discretionary (2510,2520,2530,2540,2550) and consumer staples
(3010,3020,3030). Firms in health care (3510,3520), ￿nancial services (4010,4020,4030,4040),
information technology and telecommunication services (410, 4520, 4030, 4040, 5010) com-
prise Sector 3, which we call services. In our sample 37 percent of the ￿rms belong to the
primary sector, 28 percent to the consumer goods sector, and the remaining 35 percent
to the services sector. Firm size was categorized by total employees and total assets, the
6median ￿rm in each size category determining whether the other ￿rms are called large or
small. The sample mean value of total assets is $18.2 billion (2000 US) with standard de-
viation $76.2 billion, while the sample mean number of employees is 23,659 with standard
deviation 65,702.
Four measures of experience were included to capture the potential of on-the-job train-
ing. Executive experience is the number of years elapsed since the manager was ￿rst
recorded as one of the top eight paid executives in the sample. Tenure is years spent
working at the employee￿ s current ￿rm. We also tracked the number of moves the man-
ager made throughout his career in di⁄erent jobs and ranks, as well as the number of
moves since becoming an executive. Promotion is a indicator variable for whether the
manager was promoted recently or not.
We followed Antle and Smith (1985, 1986), Hall and Liebman (1998), Margiotta and
Miller (2000) and Gayle and Miller (2008a, 2008b) by using total compensation to measure
executive compensation. Total compensation is the sum of salary and bonus, the value of
restricted stocks and options granted, the value of retirement and long term compensation
schemes, plus changes in wealth from holding ￿rm options, and changes in wealth from
holding ￿rm stock relative to a well diversi￿ed market portfolio instead. Changes in wealth
from holding ￿rm stock and options re￿ ect the costs a manager incurs from not being able
to fully diversify his wealth portfolio because of restrictions on stock and option sales.
When forming their portfolio of real and ￿nancial assets, managers recognize that part of
the return from their ￿rm denominated securities should be attributed to aggregate factors,
so they reduce their holdings of other stocks to neutralize those factors. Hence the change
in wealth from holding their ￿rms￿stock is the value of the stock at the beginning of the
period multiplied by the abnormal return, de￿ned as the residual component of returns
that cannot be priced by aggregate factors the manager does not control. (In our sample
the mean abnormal return is -0.005 with standard deviation 0.6, and we do not reject the
null hypothesis that it is uncorrelated with the stock market.)
Table 3 describes the characteristics of management by sector and ￿rm size. At 27
percent, Rank 2 is the most commonly observed rank, which re￿ ects the diversity of
promotion schemes across ￿rms. By way of contrast, the top and bottom ranks each
only contribute 6 percent to the sample population. The distribution of ranks across
the three sectors is roughly independent but small ￿rms, as measured by either assets of
employment, have a greater proportion of their executives congregating in the lower ranks,
with 30 percent versus 20 in the bottom two ranks.
The mean age of executives is almost 54 years with a standard deviation of about
9. Only 4 percent of the sample are female, ranging between 3 percent in the primary
sector and 5 percent in the consumer sector. Roughly speaking, formal education is
uniformly distributed evenly between bachelor degree or less, professional certi￿cation
(in accounting or law for example), MBA, some other Master￿ s degree, and Ph.D. The
distribution is approximately independent of ￿rm size and sector, ranging from 15 percent
with an MS/MA in the consumer sector to 27 percent in small ￿rms by employee for
professionally certi￿ed executives.
Tenure in the ￿rm averages about 14 years, about 40 years less than age, with standard
deviation of about 11, two years more. The sectors are ranked the same way with respect
to age and tenure; similarly ￿rms with small assets have both the oldest executives and
7the longest tenure. In these respects average age, ￿rm sector and size are almost su¢ cient
statistics for average tenure, giving the deceptive appearance at this level of aggregation
that executives within ￿rms follow a well de￿ned career track. Averaging across the
sample, there are two rank and/or ￿rm turnover moves per observation, one of which
has occurred since acquiring executive status. About one third of executives have been
promoted within the last two years.
The most important di⁄erences between the executives across ￿rm size and sector relate
to their compensation. Regardless of which measure is used, the mean salary and bonus in
small ￿rms is about two thirds the mean in large ￿rms, about half the total compensation,
with standard deviations about one third smaller. This suggests that similarly named
positions in small ￿rms are not comparable to their analogues in large ￿rms and may help
explain di⁄erences between internal and external transitions.
Summarizing di⁄erences across ￿rm type, the consumer sector has the lowest percent
of executives with advance degrees and the highest percent of female executives, while the
service sector has the lowest average tenure and the highest promotion rate and highest
total compensation. Total compensation is roughly twice as large in large ￿rms (using
both measures), promotion and turnover rates are greater, tenure is lower, and there are
more executives holding MBA degrees.
Table 4 describes the characteristics of executives by rank. The average age between
Rank 1 and 3 declines from 60 to 52, but is more or less constant as rank falls o⁄ further.
Similarly average tenure is roughly constant in the lower and middle ranks at 14 but rises
to 15 and 17 for Ranks 2 and 1 respectively. The average gap between Ranks 1 and 3 in
executive experience is 6 years. To summarize, relative to the lower ranks, Ranks 1 and
2 are 8 years older, with only 6 years more executive experience and just 2 years more
tenure, late bloomers hired by the ￿rm late in their career. Not that they are likely to
move more than those who do not reach the top levels; although 8 years older the they
average the same number of past moves, before and after becoming an executive.
Females form a very small fraction of the executive sample, and they are not uniformly
distributed by rank. By a factor of two to three, females congregate in the lower executive
ranks relative to males; 2 percent of the top two ranks are females, while 6 percent of
Ranks 5 and 6 are female. With regard to the education background variables, the two
most striking features are that there is higher percent (out of total executives in the rank)
of executives with MBA degrees in the top 4 ranks, the percent of executive with another
Masters degree or a Ph.D. is greater in the bottom there ranks, and there is a larger
percent of executives with professional certi￿cation in the bottom 4 ranks.
Average total compensation and the salary components rise from Rank 7, are maxi-
mized at Rank 2, at levels that are more than twice as high as the corresponding ￿gures
for Rank 7, and decline. The salary component for Rank 1 is only eclipsed by Rank 2,
but it is an open question whether the total ￿nancial compensation package o⁄ered for a
Rank 1 position is more or less desirable than the o⁄er for a Rank 5 position. Although
the average compensation $2.7 million for Rank 2 exceeds the Rank 5 mean by almost
$400,000, the standard deviation for the former is more than twice that of the latter. For
example, if all compensation variation observed in the data was resolved before an execu-
tive accepted a position, implying the standard deviation simply re￿ ects heterogeneity in
￿xed pay contracts, then there would be many Rank 5 positions that pay better than many
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executive accepted his job, implying the standard deviation is a measure of the income
uncertainty, the executive would prefer Rank 5 to Rank 1 position if he was su¢ ciently
risk averse.
2.3 Compensation
Table 5 reports OLS and LAD results from regressing how compensation varies with ￿rms￿
and executives￿characteristics. The (conditional) level e⁄ects are given in the ￿rst two
columns of estimates, their interactions with abnormal returns in the second two. Con-
trolling for background demographics and tenure more or less leaves intact the qualitative
rank ordering on total compensation we found in Table 3. Total compensation to Ranks
6 and 7 di⁄er by a statistically insigni￿cant amount, and then rises with promotion, spik-
ing at Rank 2, compensation to Rank 1 falling between Ranks 3 and 4. In contrast the
unconditional means and standard deviations reported in Table 3, however, the results
from the regression analysis separate the e⁄ects of excess return, which induces uncer-
tainty to manager￿ s total compensation, from the background variables that determine
observed heterogeneity. Note that Rank 1 is more a⁄ected by excess returns than every
rank except 2. Thus Rank 1 has a lower (OLS) or the same (LAD) estimated mean and
more dependence on abnormal returns than Rank 3, while Rank 2 has a higher mean but
more dependence than Rank 3. Therefore Rank 3 o⁄ers a superior total compensation
package to Rank 1, and for su¢ ciently risk averse executives, a more attractive compen-
sation package than the Rank 2. Continuing in this vein, dependence on excess returns
is essentially eliminated by remaining in the middle or lower ranks; our results show that
Ranks 4 though 7 are hardly a⁄ected by excess returns.
All the ￿rm size and sector variables have signi￿cant coe¢ cients except the OLS es-
timator of the level e⁄ect distinguishing the consumer from service sector. None of the
background variables for executives interact signi￿cantly in the OLS regression, but al-
most all have signi￿cant level e⁄ects irrespective of estimator. A notable exception are the
coe¢ cients relating to gender. The OLS estimator indicates that gender has no e⁄ect on
compensation level or its dependence on abnormal returns, whereas the LAD estimator
implies there is a small positive level e⁄ect of $91,731 and signi￿cantly reduced depen-
dence on abnormal returns, both factors making an executive positions more attractive to
females relative to males.
With respect to education the OLS results show, that after controlling for the other
observed di⁄erences, Ph.D. and MBA graduates earn more than $300,000 in excess of
executives with undergraduate degrees only, who earn $386,793 more than those with
professional certi￿cation only. Compensation is quadratic in age as is the case in wage
regressions for many occupations. Tenure, executive experience and the number of past
moves have statistically signi￿cant e⁄ects on compensation but are small and inconse-
quential in magnitude. More noteworthy is the large estimated sign-on bonus associated
with turnover, $551,859 for LAD and $994,989 for OLS.
Overall our results suggest that after controlling for rank and ￿rm type, there are
signi￿cant returns from acquiring general human capital in formal education, but little
from ￿rm speci￿c capital that is measured in terms of tenure within any one job and/or
experience acquired at a variety of jobs. Similarly gender is not a useful predictor of
9wages given the other executive￿ s and other characteristics and the nature of the job. To
summarize, aside from formal education, job transitions and the abnormal returns of their
own ￿rms are the main drivers determining how wealthy executives become.
2.4 Promotion and Turnover
The coe¢ cients on logistic regressions, reported in Table 5, indicate how the probability
of internal promotion, external promotion and turnover vary with ￿rm and individual
characteristics. Accounting for executives ￿xed-e⁄ects or ￿rm ￿xed-e⁄ects in internal
promotions, where we have the most observations, does not change the correlations much.
The coe¢ cient on the ranks show that the lower the rank the higher the probability of
being promoted, implying that promotions up the ranks become more infrequent and the
hierarchy looks like an inverted cone.
Internal promotion is signi￿cantly higher in the service sector than the other two.
Firms with many employees are more likely to promote their employees than those with
few, but the probability of executives leaving ￿rms with bigger workforce is also higher.
The value of the ￿rm￿ s assets do not have a signi￿cant a⁄ect on promotion or turnover.
Excess returns, both current and lagged, reduce the probability of promotion, evidence
that executives are not rewarded with promotion for superior ￿rm performance. However
poor ￿nancial performance also increases the probability that executives will leave the
￿rm. Similarly executive compensation does not signi￿cantly a⁄ect promotion prospects,
but is positively related to turnover. The probability of moves is non-monotonic in the
executive￿ s current rank: external promotion is more likely amongst the lower ranks and
also Rank 2 than in the middle ranks.
The probability of promotion is much higher conditional on switching ￿rms, versus
staying with the existing employer. However tenure also increases the probability of inter-
nal promotion. The number of previous moves increases both the probability of internal
promotion and turnover, but reduces the probability of external promotion. Managers
who moved more in the past are more likely to move again. Executives who do not have
a bachelor degree, and those who have professional certi￿cation are less likely to be pro-
moted than those with other formal education. Executives with MBA degrees are more
likely to move to jobs of the same or lower rank, while those with doctorates are less
likely to receive an external promotion but just as likely to leave. Thus both these highly
educated groups exhibit a greater willingness to take lower ranked jobs in other ￿rms
Age is negatively correlated with internal promotion and turnover, but older executives
behave the same way as their younger counterparts when it comes to outside promotions.
Women are promoted at the same rate as men internally, but turn over more than men,
even though they are promoted to external positions less frequently than men.
2.5 State Variables and Conditional Choice Probabilities
These ￿ndings motivate our formulation of the market for executives and their career
concerns, without which we cannot disentangle the e⁄ects of human capital, the risk pre-
mium for income uncertainty induced by incentive pay, and the nonpecuniary features
of managerial work. The model is identi￿ed and estimated from data on executive com-
pensation, the ￿rm￿ s abnormal returns, and the transition choices executives make each
10period conditional on the values of their state variables, factors that a⁄ect their current
and future payo⁄s. We denote the state variables relevant for the nth manager at the time
t by znt; one of Z < 1 possible characteristics, the ranks by r 2 f1;:::;Rg and the ￿rm
types by s 2 f1;:::;Sg. In our model zn;t+1; the nth manager￿ s state variables in the
period t + 1, are fully determined by znt; the type of ￿rm he transitions to, denoted snt;
and his rank next period, rnt; by a mapping zn;t+1 ￿ f (znt;rnt;snt); which we de￿ne in
the next section. Our theory models the transition of znt to zn;t+1 through the compet-
itive equilibrium choices of (rnt;snt); a stochastic process that generates the data. The
structural estimation of our theoretical framework uses as input reduced form estimates
of P (rnt;snt jznt); the probability of (rnt;snt) conditional on znt:
In the ￿nal part of this section we report our estimates for the reduced form of our
model. Since R and S are ￿nite, and we assume Z is a ￿nite set, it follows that in prin-
ciple cell estimators could be used to recover P (rnt;snt jznt). Although our sample size,
59,066, is very large compared with all previous studies of this market, the comprehensive
detail that accompanies each observation also greatly magni￿es the total number of cells
RSZ;needed to estimate the model, so this procedure is not feasible. For example only
5 percent of the observations in our sample are female, and none of them have doctor-
ates and head small ￿rms. Many smoothing algorithms are asymptotically equivalent.
We used multinomial logits to estimate the reduced form, because of their computational
tractability in recovering the structural parameters, because the logit estimates are easy to
interpret, and because they illustrate how the variation in our data is used to estimate the
underlying structure. For expositional convenience we decomposed P (rnt;snt jznt) into
P (rnt;snt jznt) ￿ P (rnt jznt;snt)P (snt jznt)
and separately estimated P (snt jznt); the probability of ￿rm type selected as a function
of the state variables, from P (rnt jznt;snt); the selection of rank conditional on both the
state variables and also the ￿rm selected.
Table 6 presents our estimates of P (snt jznt): The columns refer to the type of ￿rm
chosen conditional on moving from the current employer, and the state variables are
de￿ned by the rows. The omitted (column) choice is to remain employed with the current
￿rm one more period, and the base line (row) category is a college educated Rank 1
executive employed in a ￿rm of type 1.
MBAs go to 7. MSMAs and Ph.D.￿ s don￿ t transit as much, as we saw in the previous
table. controlling for other state variables we now also see that no degree executives also
do not move as much as the college educated group. Female behave the same as males.
Similarly tenure and male have no signi￿cant e⁄ects on the probability of an external
move. Older execs are more likely to leave and conditional on leaving are less likely to go
3 than the other types.
Perhaps the most striking feature of this table is that when executives move they join
￿rms similar to the ones they left, that is de￿ned in terms of sector and size. Furthermore
conditional on moving to a ￿rm of di⁄erent size, they are more likely to join a ￿rm in the
same sector as the one they left. Broadly speaking, the bottom rows, referring to the rank
of the executive at the beginning of the period, show that highly ranked executives are
less likely to move than the lower ranked ones, evident form the fact that the estimated
coe¢ cients increase in each row.
11The ￿nal column of Table 6 reports on the probability of leaving the sample for at least
two years and never returning, a condition we call retirement. The higher the rank the less
likely the probability of retirement, indicated by the decreasing sequence of coe¢ cients on
rank. Possibly for very di⁄erent reasons, executives and those without formal quali￿cations
are more likely to exit this sample than groups with other formal education. The indicator
variable for gender has a far bigger impact than any of the education variables. Mirroring
female labor supply more generally, women in this highly select and lucrative market are
more likely to withdraw from it than their male colleagues and competitors. Finally there
are signi￿cant sector di⁄erences.
Finally our estimates of P (rnt jznt;snt) are presented in Table 7. Many of the coe¢ -
cients for the background variables on education education, age, tenure, and experience
are readily comparable with the unconditional sample averages reported in Table 4. For
example Table 4 shows that female executives with a doctorate are overrepresented in
the lower ranks, and Table 7 shows they are more likely to select into the bottom rank.
The conditional choice probability estimates shed light on the e⁄ects of tenure and age,
highly correlated variables with di⁄erent impacts that are masked by the sample averages
reported in Table 4. Here we see that, controlling for all other state variables, last period
employer, and this year￿ s employer as well, Rank 2 executives are in fact older than Rank
1 executives, signi￿ed by the higher coe¢ cient estimate. Just as startling is the ￿nding
that, for given values of the other observed factors, lower ranked employees have more
tenure, rather than less, as the unconditional averages in Table 4 might suggest.
Similarly the rows referring to ￿rm sector (for both the previous period and the current
one) loosely match up to the ￿rst 7 elements in the Table 3 columns, while the rows
referring to the ranks provide a conditional analogue to the transition matrix in Table 2.
For example the highest coe¢ cients invariably show staying in the same rank is the most
likely outcome, and an executive in the lowest rank is more likely to move to Rank i than
Rank i + 1: Similarly Rank 4 executives are more likely to be demoted than be promoted
to Rank 3, evident from both the sample transition matrix of Table 2 and the estimated
coe¢ cients in Table 7. Nevertheless the conditional transition probability paints a more
ambiguous picture of the career hierarchy than the Transition probability matrix displayed
in Table 2. Thus following the promotion path de￿ned in Table 1 and Figure 1 seems more
problematic for Rank 2 executives in particular, who are more likely to be demoted to
Ranks 3 through 5 than be promoted to Rank 1. The results in Table 7 are foreshadowed
in Table 5, which shows that relative to other executives, turnover for a Rank 2 manager
is more likely than external promotion.
3 Model
Our model focuses on the promotion, turnover, and executive compensation when the
manager is subject to moral hazard. The promotions and career prospects vary across
￿rms and jobs. In particular, managers accumulate human capital while working. The
value of the human capital varies across jobs and ￿rms. Executives accumulate general
and ￿rm-speci￿c human capital while working. Firms are in￿nitely lived and executives
are ￿nitely lived. They can work for at most T periods. We assume that the labor market
is competitive. At the beginning of each period there are contracts that specify a one-
12period compensation plan, which depends on the job title, ￿rm characteristics and worker￿ s
observable characteristics. The information in the model is incomplete. Executives have
private information on taste shocks which a⁄ect their utility from working in a particular
job and ￿rm. Observing their taste shocks at the beginning of each period, executives
choose a contract, and then a work routine that is not observed by the directors, and also
picks real consumption expenditure for the period.
The objective of the manager is to sequentially maximize her expected lifetime utility,
but she competes with other managers for her position. To convince the board that she
will pursue the goal of the ￿rm, which we assume is value maximization, the manager
chooses a contract that aligns her interests with those of the ￿rm. This alignment is
embedded in the incentive compatibility constraints. We solve for Walrasian equilibrium,
with rational expectations. The compensation value of the contract in equilibrium is set so
that given each workers observable characteristics and the realizations of the idiosyncratic
taste shock (with respect to the job), and given the available market contracts, markets
clear. Given the available market contracts, no worker can increase utility by switching
jobs, and no ￿rm can increase pro￿ts by replacing executives.
3.1 Lifetime Utility
The risk-averse managers maximize expected life-time utility. ￿ is the constant absolute
risk aversion parameter. Denote the time period by t 2 f0;1;:::g . There are M ￿rms in
the market. Firms are indexed by m 2 [0;:::;Mg; with m = 0 representing retirement. We
assume retirement is an absorbing state. There are K di⁄erent types of positions, index by
k 2 f1;:::;Kg. De￿ne Imkt 2 f0;1g to be an indicator of the mangers￿choice of a job k
in ￿rm m. Note that I0kt = 1 means the executive chooses to retire. lmkt ￿ (l1mkt;l2mkt)
denote the two activities for ￿rm m 6= 0, in job k: Activity two requires higher e⁄ort
level. De￿ne ljmkt 2 f0;1g as the indicator for choice of e⁄ort in a particular position in
a particular ￿rm. j 2 f1;2g; ￿rm and retirement retirement m = 0;l1mkt = l2mkt = 1 for
all k and t. ￿ is the constant subjective discount factor. Managers have permanent taste
parameters ￿jmk which de￿ne the utility parameters associated with job, ￿rm and e⁄ort
level choice: Imkt = 1 and ljmkt = 1: There is an individual taste shock that is indexed by
time, ￿rm, and position denoted by "mkt. If a manager retires, m = 0, then ￿jmk = ￿0
for all j and k; and "0kt = "0t for all k: For any choice of job m 6= 0 we assume that









We assume there exists a complete set of markets for all publicly disclosed events relating
to commodities, with price measure ￿t de￿ned on Ft and derivative ￿t: This implies that
consumption by the manager is limited by a lifetime budget constraint, which re￿ ects the
opportunities she faces as a trader and the expectations she has about her compensa-
tion. The lifetime wealth constraint is endogenously determined by the manager￿ s work
activities. By assuming markets exist for consumption contingent on any public event, we
13e⁄ectively attribute all deviations from the law of one price to the particular market im-
perfections under consideration. Let et denote the endowment at date t. We also measure
wmk;t+1; the manager￿ s compensation for employment at rank k for ￿rm n in period t, in
units of current consumption. To indicate the dependence of the consumption possibility
set on the set of contingent plans determining labor supply and e⁄ort, we de￿ne E0 [￿jl]
as the expectations operator conditional on work and e⁄ort level choices throughout the
manager￿ s working life. The budget constraint can then be expressed as
Et(￿t+1ent+1) + ￿tcnt ￿ ￿tent + Et(￿t+1wmkt+1jljkmt;Imkt) (1)
3.3 Output
Managers are risk averse, therefore, the optimal contract is contingent only on the returns
that the manager actions a⁄ects their probability distribution. Since managers are risk
averse (an assumption we test empirically), his certainty equivalent for a risk bearing
security is less than the expected value of security, so shareholders would diversify amongst
themselves every ￿rm security whose returns are independent of the manager￿ s activities,
rather than use it to pay the manager. We de￿ne the abnormal returns of the ￿rm as
the residual component of returns that cannot be priced by aggregate factors the manager
does not control. In an optimal contract compensation to the manager might depend on
this residual in order to provide him with appropriate incentives, but it should not depend
on changes in stochastic factors that originate outside the ￿rm, which in any event can
be neutralized by adjustments within his wealth portfolio through the other stocks and
bonds he holds.
More speci￿cally, letting #mt denote the value of the ￿rm at time t; the gross abnormal








where ￿t is the return on the market portfolio in period t and dmt is the dividend.
This study assumes that xt is a random variable that depends on the managers￿ ef-
forts in the previous period but, conditional on the e⁄ort vector of the executive branch
fl1mkt;l2mktg
K
k=1, is independently and identically distributed across both ￿rms and peri-
ods.
3.4 Human Capital Accumulation and Managerial Skill
We assume that the rate in which the manager accumulates general and ￿rm-speci￿c
capital depends on the type of ￿rm and the manager￿ s e⁄ort level. More speci￿cally, we
assume that human capital is only accumulated if the manager works diligently. The













Note that since l2mkt￿s is private information then ht is also the private information of
the manager. The executive endowed skill vector, zl, is ￿xed over time.
3.5 Firms and Technology
Each ￿rms is characterized by a vector zf, which measure of ￿rms size, capital structure
and industrial mix: De￿ne f(xjlm1t;:::lmKt;zf), as the probability density function for xt,
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l2mkt < K ￿ 1
This speci￿cation assumes that if one manager shirks then his human capital does not
have a⁄ect the output of the ￿rm. There is no distinction in the e⁄ect of two or more
than two executive shirking on the output of the ￿rm.
Let Fm1(:j:), Fm2(:j:),and Fm1k(:j:) denote the probability distribution functions, re-
spectively, associated with fm1(:j:), fm2(:j:),and fm1k(:j:): In order to obtain the e⁄ect of







t ;zf) ￿ Fm1(xjzf)
We can the de￿ne two likelihood ratio of each rank. Note that the shareholders now have
three possible set of contracts to choose from. The ￿rst option is to have all managers
work diligently; in that case, their returns are drawn from Fm2(xjzf): The second case is
the case of partial diligence; in that case the return is drawn from Fm1(xjht;hmt;zf): The
￿nal option is that all managers shirk, and the return is drawn from Fm1(x): We can then
















Note that if the second case hold then the compensation of the executive in rank
k would not vary with x. This is empirically testable and since the compensation of
executives of all rank sin our study varies with returns we are going to assume that the
shareholders speci￿ed that they want the return to be drawn from Fm2(xjzf):
153.6 Solving the Model
At the beginning of every period, executives privately observe realizations of preference
shocks and choose consumption. Firms then make a one-period contract o⁄ers to execu-
tives, and executives choose one of the contracts. Each executive then chooses an e⁄ort
level which he privately observed. The realization of the outcome x is revealed at the
end of the period, and is a common knowledge and the executives is paid wmkt+1. The
complete labor market history is common knowledge.
De￿nition 1 A Walrasian Market Equilibrium is a set of contracts o⁄ered for each combi-
nation of ￿rm, job, e⁄ort level and manager characteristics. Taking beliefs about the man-
agers￿type and prices as given, the contracts maximize ￿rms￿pro￿ts, executives￿choice
of a contract and e⁄ort level maximize their utility. Firms￿beliefs about executives￿type
satisfy rational expectations, and the executive market clears.
The model is solved in stages. Managers are price takers, therefore, the manager￿ s
problem of consumption and contract choices are equivalent to a single agent dynamic
choice problems. We ￿rst derive the indirect utility function for executives who retire,
and then solve for optimal consumption when the manager works for at least one period
and then retires. Using the valuation function that solves this problem, we then derive the
optimal choice of job and ￿rm for the worker, for any given set of contracts available in
the market. We then solve for the employers￿problem of o⁄ering an optimal contract for
managers and choosing a combination of managers to the various position in the hierarchy;
the optimal contracts circumscribe the short term contracts.
3.6.1 The Manager￿ s Problem
In order to derive the solution to the optimal consumption decision we start out with
the conditional valuation function for working one period at time t and then retiring and
dying at n + 1; where the nonpecuniary parts of utility from working are "mkt (is the
expected conditional valuation of this unobserved nonpecuniary bene￿t, and ￿k treated
as a parameter, where ￿0 is also estimated as a parameter. For notational ease denote by
zmt = (hmt;ht); assume that zmt has ￿nite support Z, let bt denoted the period t price of
a in￿nitely lived bond, and at the price of a security that pays o⁄ the (random) dividend
(ln￿s ￿ sln￿ ￿ ln￿t) is period s.







derive from maximizing the utility subject to the budget constraint in equation 1 into the







































16is the value of the expected compensation based on period t contract, and job choice prob-
abilities for s > t are de￿ned as
￿jmk(z0jzmt;ljmk;Imkt) ￿ Pr(Im0k0t+1 = 1;zm0k0t+1 = z0;ljmkt+1 = 1jzf;zmt;ljmk;Imkt)
and the term ￿
t+1;j

































Next, we begin by describing the managers￿optimal job choice, given the vector of
available contracts. We can write the indirect utility as






























By normalizing ￿0 = 1; and noting that retirement is an absorbing state, we can express
the indirect utility function for all m 6= 0 as






















and for the retirement m = 0;









Therefore, given a vector of contracts an executive faces and given the distribution of
the preferences shocks, the conditional choice probabilities of each job is given by
Pr(I0
mkt = 1jlk;m;2 = 1;zmt;zf) = Pr(￿bt log(￿V2mkt) ￿ ￿bt log(￿V2m0k0t) jzmt;zf);8(m;k) 6= (m0;k0)
Under the assumption that "mkt are independently and identically distributed type I ex-
treme value we get that the choice probability if each job is
Pr(I
0

















17and the choice of retirement is
Pr(I
0













3.6.2 The Firm￿ s Maximization Problem
The ￿rm chooses, period by period, the managers￿e⁄ort level and o⁄er them contracts
that minimize the sum of the discounted expected wage bill
PK
k=1 Et(wmkt+1) or equiva-
lently, maximizes
PK
k=1 Et(ln￿mkt+1): First, shareholders compare the costs and bene￿ts
of an incentive compatible compensation package that elicits diligent work versus a (lower
cost) scheme that provides some or all managers with the nonpecuniary bene￿t of low
e⁄ort. Second, contract o⁄ers for managerial skills imply probability distribution of hir-
ing di⁄erent types of managers to a certain position, these contracts maximize the ￿rm￿ s
pro￿ts, given the market contracts.
We begin by deriving the cost minimizing contract that elicits high e⁄ort from any
possible manager, ￿rm and job. The manager￿ s continuation value from shirking is weakly
smaller than the continuation value associated with diligent work. That is V2mkt￿ V 1mkt;












The compensation required to elicit high e⁄ort depends on the taste for e⁄ort in each
￿rm and job the likelihood ratio. This is standard in moral hazard models. The likelihood
ratio in our model, however, depends on ￿rm characteristics, the manager￿ s skill and





e⁄ect of di⁄erences in human capital accumulated from diligent work versus shirking on
productivity. That is, in ￿rms and jobs in which the value of human capital has large e⁄ect
on promotion and future compensation, the pay required to elicit diligence is smaller. This
ratio also depends on the manager￿ s characteristics. It is larger, for example, the longer
the career horizon and may vary by the current stock of human capital and the manager￿ s
skill.
Next, suppose PE
mk(zm), is the ￿rms￿beliefs about probability of hiring when a contract
￿k;m;t+1(zmt;zf) is o⁄ered. Then the cost minimizing contract for a given e⁄ort level





































18The left hand side of the above condition is the expected continuation value (over the
individual taste shocks) from accepting the contract. It depends on the job-￿rm taste
parameters, and the implied continuation values of working in the job. It increases in the
implied promotion probabilities and expected future earning (low ￿
t+1;2
mkt ) The right hand
side is a function of the expected outside option available to the manager and its implied
continuation values.






































Lemma 4 In the equilibrium where all size of ￿rms elicit high e⁄ort for all managers in































































See the proof in the Appendix. Equation 11 implies an expected utility level UE
mk(zmt)
required to attract a manager with characteristics zm to a job k in ￿rm m with probability
PE
mk(zmt): The expected utility increases in the outside options of the manager. As dis-
cussed above, the expected costs to the ￿rm depends on the promotion probabilities and
the continuation value attached to the job relative to the continuation values of working in
other jobs. Firm-speci￿c human capital accumulated on the job, should increase the value
of working in the ￿rm relative to the outside options and therefore, reduces the expected
cost of the contract to the ￿rm. General human capital increases the outside option.
Given rational expectations by ￿rms, their beliefs about the hiring probabilities are
consistent with the manager￿ s choice probabilities
Pr(I
0
mkt= 1jlk;m;2= 1;zmt) = PE
mk(zmt)









That is, given the market contracts managers are either hired to a position or retire.
4 Identi￿cation and Estimation
The taste parameters in our model are 2MK + 1 positive real numbers, 2MK scalars
indicating utility losses for high and low e⁄ort, generically denoted by ￿2mk and ￿1mk
respectively, plus a parameter for risk aversion ￿: In this paper we assume these parameters
do not depend on the executive￿ s background variables, but as the subscripts indicate, ￿jmk
is sector m 2 f1;:::;Mg and rank k 2 f1;:::;Kg speci￿c for j 2 f1;2g:8 There are three
functions governing the ￿rms￿excess returns, the probability density function of abnormal
returns when every manager is diligent, denoted fm2 (xjzf ); the density when only one
of the kth ranked executive o¢ cers shirks, denoted fm1k (xjzf ); and the density when
more than one executive shirks, fm1 (xjzf ): Outcomes from the fm2 (xjzf ) density are
observed in the data, and inferences about fm1k (xjzf ) can be made from the estimated
compensation schedule using restrictions implied by the equilibrium contract. However
there is no information about fm1 (xjzf ); because the outcomes from this distribution are
not directly observed, and none of the agents consider this distribution when making their
own choices.
Since fm2 (xjzf ) can be estimated using standard nonparametric methods with data
(or in our case consistent estimates of) excess returns, and fm1 (xjzf ) is not identi￿ed, we
focus our discussion of identi￿cation and estimation on the taste parameters mentioned
above, and the likelihood ratio g2mk(xjzf) ￿ fm1k (xjzf )=fm2 (xjzf ): This section ana-
lyzes identi￿cation and describes an algorithm for sequentially estimating the model from
the panel data using background information on the managers, their ￿rm type, compen-
sation and rank. We imposed a regularity condition on g2mk(xjzf) that for all (m;k;zf)
there exists some ￿nite return x such that g2mk(x0jzf) = 0 for all x0 > x: This assumption
implies that, should the ￿rm performance at the end of the period be truly outstanding,
then shareholders would be certain that all the executives had worked diligently during
the period. Given the minimal movement in bond prices over this period, we also as-
sumed simpli￿ed several of the formulas by assuming, the bond price is constant, setting
bt = b: Finally we assume that the privately observed taste shock "mkt is independently
and identically distributed extreme value Type 1.
Estimation proceeded sequentially in ￿ve steps:
1. Sample analogues of the equilibrium choice probabilities PE
mk (z) for each sector
m 2 f1;:::;Mg; rank k 2 f1;:::;Kg and background characteristics of the ￿rm
and executive z 2 Z ; were formed from a reduced form multinomial logit model.
2. We estimated annual excess returns for ￿rms in equation 2 from the data, and then
computed, conditional on the state variables, a nonparametric estimator of total
8Recall that without loss of generality we normalized the taste parameter for retirement to ￿0 = 1.
20compensation from our imputed values compiled from the data, which we assume is
the sum of true compensation and independent measurement error. We used Kernel
methods to nonparametrically estimate wo
2mk (x;z); the compensation schedule for




















3. Substituting the estimators for PE















which holds for all (m;k;z); we exploited the restrictions of the competitive selection
embodied in the market clearing condition to obtain estimates of ￿2mk for each (m;k)
and the risk aversion parameter ￿; a step we discuss below in more detail.
4. Substituting in the estimated wage functions and the estimated risk aversion parame-
ter into the right side of we estimated likelihood ratio g2mk(xjzf) nonparametrically









5. Finally the taste parameters for shirking ￿1mk for each (m;k) were inferred from the



















Since a detailed description and the empirical results of the ￿rst step is given in the
data section, the second step is routine, Gayle and Miller (2008a, 2008c) analyze the fourth
step and its derivation, this only leaves the third and ￿fth steps to comment upon now.
Making (￿2mk=￿1mk) the subject of the incentive compatibility condition, and substituting



























mkt (z) is identi￿ed, then
(￿2mk=￿1mk) is separately identi￿ed for each background set of variables z.
21Thus identi￿cation of the model reduces to recovering ￿2mk for each (m;k) and ￿ from
the market clearing condition in the third stage, a total of MK +1 parameters. Note that
the market clearing condition holds for every rank k; for every background z; and in every
￿rm type m; meaning there are MKZ competitive selection conditions (retirement ensur-
ing Walras￿law, market clearance, is satis￿ed). Consequently all MK +1 parameters are
identi￿ed subject to the usual rank conditions if there is observed heterogeneity amongst
the executives that does not a⁄ect their preferences. In our application we assume the
taste parameters are not functions of tenure, executive experience and age, but that these
variables have di⁄erential e⁄ects on promotions and other transitions.
Our estimator of the ￿2mk parameters and the ￿, based on the competitive selection
equations, is
p
NT consistent and asymptotically normal, the covariance di⁄ering from
the standard formula only because the choice probabilities and the compensation schedule
are estimated in the ￿rst two steps. We have three remarks about its implementation.
First, rather than form MKZ orthogonality conditions from the conditional expectation
















using the counting variables, tenure, executive experience and age as instruments, after
substituting in an approximating function b UE
mk(z) for UE
mk(z). The former di⁄ers from
the latter only because consistent estimators for PE
mk (zm) and wo
2mk (z) are used instead
of their true values. The remaining background variables, categorical variables signifying
educational background and gender, were also used as conditioning variables in forming
the orthogonality functions for the estimator. Second, when forming the recursion that
de￿nes ￿
t+1;j
mkt (z); used in the de￿nitions of b UE
mk(z) and UE
mk(z); we exploited the fact
that, given the manager￿ s choice, the transition of znt to znt+1 is deterministic. From the

























znt+1 = z0 jznt;Imkt = 1;ljmk = 1
￿
Third, the Type 1 extreme value assumption for "mkt is by no means critical for the via-
bility of our empirical approach, but simpli￿es the formula for its conditional expectation,
as indicated by the following Lemma, proved in the appendix.







jzmt;Imkt = 1;ljmkt = 1] =





22The second and third remarks directly imply the recursion for ￿
t+1;j





























5 Investment versus Moral Hazard
In the concluding section to this paper we assess how much agency problems in executive
markets are mitigated by their career concerns. Two of the four metrics we use measure
the impact of an executive shirking rather than working. We estimated how much ab-
normal returns would fall if shareholders failed to incentivize one of its executives but
continued to pay the other according to the optimal schedule. This is one measure of how
much a ￿rm stands to lose by ignoring the moral hazard problem. The executive, on the
other hand, is much more concerned with the compensating di⁄erential between diligence
and shirking. We computed the compensating di⁄erential to an executive from following
his interests (shirking) rather than acting according to the interests of the shareholders
(working diligently). The other two metrics focus on the cost of eliminating the moral
hazard problem. We report on how much the ￿rm pays to induce diligence in the presence
of human capital investment, a risk premium for eliminating the moral hazard problem.
Finally we calculate how much more a ￿rm would have to pay if executives were not mo-
tivated by career concerns, ambition that helps to internalize what would otherwise be a
more substantial moral hazard problem.
Each metric was computed using the structural estimates obtained from the previous
section, by executive rank, averaged over ￿rm type and executive background. Thus
successive rows in Table 9 report a sample average for the rank and its standard deviation,
conditional on optimal behavior by the rest of the management team. For the purposes of
comparisons with other studies in this literature we also report the estimated risk aversion
parameter, the top entry. Quite plausible, and comparable to previous estimates found,
we note that an executive with exponential utility and risk aversion parameter of 0:45
would be willing to pay $217; 790 to insure against an actuarially fair gamble that o⁄ers
a loss of $1 million with probability one half and a gain of $1 million with probability one
half.
The ￿rst metric is an average over ￿1mk(z); the expected gross loss in the value of
the ￿rm of type m in percentage terms if a rank k executive with background z tends his
own interests for one year, instead of maximizing the expected value of the ￿rm, that is
before netting out the decline in expected compensation all executives would incur from
the deteriorating ￿nancial performance of the ￿rm. When all executives work diligently,
by de￿nition abnormal returns have mean zero, meaning E [x] = 0: Thus ￿1mk(z) is found
by integrating abnormal returns conditional on the executive in question shirking, when
every other executive works diligently:
￿1mk(z) ￿ E fx[1 ￿ gmk(x;z))]g = ￿E [xgmk(x;z)]
23We interpret ￿1mk(z) as a measure of the executive￿ s span of control, because it indicates
his potential impact on the ￿rm from behaving irresponsibly. Not surprisingly we ￿nd
Rank 2 executives exercise the greatest span of control; at 11 percent per year, a chief
executives can drive the value of ￿rm equity down to less than half its current value in
8 years, shareholders willing. Similarly, the result that the estimated span of control
declines through the middle and lower ranks, con￿rms our intuition. More remarkable is
our ￿nding that executives in Ranks 2 and 3 have a greater span of control than those in
Rank 1, as do many in Rank 4.
Taking the manager￿ s perspective rather than the ￿rm￿ s, the compensating di⁄eren-
tial between working hard and shirking, which we denote by ￿2mk(z); is measured by
di⁄erencing w0
1mk(z); the manager￿ s reservation certainty equivalent wage to shirk, from
w0
2mk(z), the manager￿ s reservation certainty equivalent wage to work diligently under
perfect monitoring. Derived from the participation constraint, these certainty equivalents







































If a manager does not maximize the value of the ￿rm, he gains utility from the nonpecu-
niary bene￿ts of pursuing his own interests, but does not acquire so much human capital,
and thus reduces his chances of higher wages and better positions in the future.
The ￿rst factor would also arise in a static model of pure moral hazard where there are







Our estimates in Table 9 show that contemporaneous nonpecuniary shirking/working ben-
e￿t di⁄erential associated with the Rank 2 position, at $2:48 million, exceed those asso-
ciated with any of the other ranks, but that the annual di⁄erential from the Rank 1
position is the next highest. Thus Rank 1 has a lesser span of control than Rank 3, but
more nonpecuniary bene￿ts. Again these bene￿ts decline through the middle and lower
ranks.
The second factor determining ￿2mk(z) re￿ ects those dynamic features of our frame-










Here we ￿nd that, on average, the bene￿ts of human capital accumulation decline monoton-
ically with rank, and that compared with ￿PM
2mk; are much less dispersed throughout the
24population of ￿rm types and executive backgrounds. At the lower ranks these bene￿ts are
quite considerable. On average a Rank 5 executive is willing to forego $1:88 million per
year because of the greater opportunities working diligently versus shirking a⁄ords him,
while a Rank 1 executive only values the human capital component of the compensating
di⁄erential at $400;000 million per year.




Our estimates imply the compensating di⁄erential for every rank except the second is
about $2 million per year, but exceeds $3 million per year for Rank 2 executives.
How much a ￿rm would be willing to eliminate moral hazard is measured by ￿3mk(z):
Under a perfect monitoring scheme shareholders would pay a manager the ￿xed wage of
w0
2mk(z), and thus eliminate the risk premium they pay him in the form of a favorable
lottery over the outcome of abnormal returns to induce diligent work. Hence the expected
value of a perfect monitor to shareholders, denoted ￿3mk(z); is the di⁄erence between
expected compensation under the current optimal scheme and w0
2mk(z); or:
￿3 ￿ E [wmk (x)jz] ￿ w0
2mk(z)










Our ￿ndings in Table 9 show that the ￿rms are prepared to pay hardly anything to
eliminate the moral hazard problem at the lower ranks, but that at the Ranks 1 and 3, the
bene￿ts of a perfect monitor are considerably more. Curiously, the average risk premium
paid to Ranks 1 and 3, $1:6 million and $1:7 million respectively, are quite close, despite
the fact that the other measures of moral hazard are not.
As one ￿nal check on the relevance of human capital to resolving moral hazard problems
in the executive market, we estimated the extra premium shareholders would pay to
eliminate the moral hazard problem if the bene￿ts of acquiring human capital was ignored
by an executive, say because neither the organizational structure nor the market rewarded







The estimates in Table 9 show that career concerns greatly ameliorate the moral haz-
ard problem for lower level executives but their importance declines monotonically with
promotion through the ranks, bordering on irrelevance for many Rank 1 executives.
6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2





















Et[￿mkt+1jzmt;zf;ljmkt = 1;Imkt = 1]
1￿ 1
bt
25Extending to the case where there are multiple jobs. If a manager works in job k in
period t the probability of him accepting job k0 in ￿rm m in period t is pk0m0
km : Choosing





















































































































































































































































The problem of working for T periods and then retiring , by induction, is:














































Proof of Lemma ?? Simply imposing that the value of working diligently weakly



























































27Simplifying, yields the condition in the Lemma. Q.E.D





































Proof. The kth ￿rst order condition is then
￿￿1


















































Taking expectation conditional on lk;m;2 = 1;zm and noting the the complimentary slack-











































































mkt (zm)) ￿ ￿kg2mk(xjzm)
#
dx = 1 (22)


























































solving to wmkt+1(x;zm) we obtain the result.
Proof of Lemma 5. Note that Imkt = 1 if Vjmkt ￿ Vjm0k0t for all (m;k) 6= (m0;k0) and




























































































































then Imkt = 1
if V jmkt + 1
bt"mkt ￿ V jm0k0t + 1
bt"m0k0t for all (m;k) 6= (m0;k0) or 1t
bt"m0k0t ￿ 1
bt"mkt ￿













"mkt ￿ V jmkt￿V jm0k0t_(m;k) 6= (m0;k0)]
(29)
29Note that if "mkt is i.i.d. extreme value type I with no scaling parameter equal one and
location parameter equals zero the 1
bt"mkt is i.d.d. extreme value Type I with scaling
parameter equals 1















Gjmk(V jmkt ￿ V j01t +
1
bt




where Gjmk(V jmkt ￿V j01t + ￿t
bt ";:::;V jmkt ￿V jMKt + ￿t
bt ") is the conditional density (See
McFadden (1978) page 82 for details). Note that if 1t
bt"mkt is i.d.d. extreme value Type I
with scaling parameter equals 1
bt and location parameter zero then
Gjmk(V jmkt ￿ V j01t +
￿t
bt
";:::;V jmkt ￿ V jMKt +
￿t
bt



















































































Note that since Aj > 0 then Aj exp(￿Aj￿) is the density of the exponential distribution
with scale parameterAj therefore
R +1






















Hence the result of the Lemma
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33Table 1-Ranks and Titles
Rank Title1 Title 2 TITLE 3
1 1a chairman & vicechair
2a schairman & sceo chairman & sother schairman & svicechair
2 3a chairman & president & ceo
4a ceo
3 5a chairman & cfo
6a chairman & execvp
6b chairman & coo
7a president & coo
9c coo
4 8a execvp
9a execvp & coo
9b execvp & cfo
10a snrvp
10b spresident
10d execvp & spresident
5 10c execvp & other
10e execvp & sceo execvp & scoo
10f spresident & sceo spresident & scoo
11a president & execvp
12a vp
12e snrvp & cfo
12f snrvp & spresident
6 12b snrvp & other
12c vp & other
12d cfo & other
13d president & cfo
13c president & other
13a snrvp & coo
13b snrvp & sceo
15a cfo
14c vp & cfo
7 14d vp & spresident
14e vp & sceo vp & scoo









12b 12c 12d 12e 12f 12a
9c
11a





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































36Table 3: Executives Characteristics by Sector and Firm Size
Compensation and Salary are measured in Thousand of 2006US$









Rank 1 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06
Rank 2 0.21 0.27 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.26
Rank 3 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.08
Rank 4 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.22
Rank 5 0.20 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.18
Rank 6 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.21 0.15 0.22 0.15
















Female 0.056 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.04
No Degree 0.20 0.18 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.21
Bachelor 0.82 0.81 0.73 0.77 0.79 0.78 0.78
MBA 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.23 0.18 0.23
MS/MA 0.22 0.19 0.15 0.24 0.18 0.23 0.19
Ph.D. 0.18 0.20 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.17
Prof.
Certi￿cation














































































































*Standard Deviation in Parenthesis
37Table 4: Executives Characteristics
Compensation and Salary are measured in Thousand of 2006 US$






































































































































































































38Table 5: Compensation Regressions
Level OLS LAD Slope OLS LAD
Constant 964.053 1,222 Excess Return 11,636.76 8,478.87
(1,417) (191.9)** (967.506)** (129.384)**
Excess Return Square -908.68 -238.373
(27.210)** (3.649)**
Consumer -4.737 83.106 Excess Return￿Consumer 2,246.78 334.718
(161.543) (21.863)** (353.561)** (47.699)**
Service 965.097 519.103 Excess Return￿Service 2,694.64 1,427.43
(149.900)** (20.291)** (288.870)** (39.047)**
Assets 0.029 0.03 Excess Return￿Asset 0.115 0.086
(0.001)** (0.000)** (0.006)** (0.001)**
Employees 16.82 16.613 Excess Return￿Employees 34.181 32.124
(1.346)** (0.182)** (4.481)** (0.606)**
Rank 2 2,090.11 1,388.09 Excess Return￿Rank 2 -388.042 1,423.73
(289.289)** (39.143)** -655.597 (88.196)**
Rank 3 896.515 65.889 Excess Return￿Rank 3 -7,142.15 -5,254.64
(352.374)* -47.683 (745.473)** (100.422)**
Rank 4 -197.024 -767.392 Excess Return￿Rank 4 -12,219.21 -8,068.44
(302.908) (40.986)** (665.071)** (89.477)**
Rank 5 -484.074 -932.005 Excess Return￿Rank 5 -14,409.11 -8,921.51
(308.492) (41.736)** (675.818)** (90.755)**
Rank 6 -998.282 -1,139.54 Excess Return￿Rank 6 -14,047.82 -9,188.51
(313.464)** (42.411)** (670.508)** (90.146)**
Rank 7 -783.61 -1,109.86 Excess Return￿Rank 7 -13,148.96 -9,227.35
(379.645)* (51.357)** (748.188)** (100.593)**
39Table 5(cont.): Compensation Regressions
Level OLS LAD Slope OLS LAD
Age 75.732 20.155 Excess Return￿ Age 136.767 29.214
(47.603) (6.444)** (12.835)** (1.711)**
Age Square -0.879 -0.155
(0.411)* (0.056)**
Female 355.209 91.731 Excess Return￿Female -377.221 -286.293
(339.929) (45.917)* (607.244) (75.045)**
No. Degree 136.194 12.363 Excess Return￿No. Degree -622.6 -68.224
(189.753) (25.679) (328.146) (44.118)
MBA 367.872 130.474 Excess Return￿MBA -249.712 234.566
(162.991)* (22.060)** (314.901) (42.495)**
MS/MA -79.861 -74.731 Excess Return￿MS/MA -64.16 -355.654
(165.083) (22.344)** (299.351) (40.481)**
Ph.D. 309.473 32.827 Excess Return￿Ph.D. -22.42 100.848
(172.953) (23.409) (312.742) (42.259)*
Prof. Cert. -385.793 -101.85 Excess Return￿Prof. Cert. -1,478.81 -199.566
(160.076)* (21.665)**
Exec. Experience -0.977 -0.078 Excess Return￿Exec. Experience -2.464 -1.086
(1.582) (0.203) -1.891 (0.151)**
Tenure -17.339 -4.573 Excess Return￿Tenure 15.764 9.271
(6.709)** (0.906)** -11.078 (1.469)**
# of past moves -32.503 -31.781 Excess Return￿# of past moves -392.886 -80.655
-48.569 (6.574)** (84.423)** (11.360)**
# of Executive Moves 52.739 21.603 Excess Return￿# of Exec. moves 153.524 10.868
(65.354) (8.839)* (114.343) -15.297
First Year with ￿rm 994.989 551.859 Excess Return￿ ￿rst year in ￿rm -579.266 -513.588
(464.134)* (62.789)** (854.534) (115.601)**









Compensation -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.006 0.007
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.003)*
Excess return -0.21 -0.239 -0.168 -0.197 -0.422
(0.030)** (0.045)** (0.034)** (0.156) (0.093)**
Excess return Lagged -0.124 -0.067 -0.082 0.054 -0.229
(0.025)** -0.038 (0.028)** -0.199 (0.076)**
Rank 2 -2.2 -2.282 -2.542 -2.993 -0.434
(0.058)** (0.113)** (0.071)** (0.496)** (0.114)**
Rank 3 -0.999 -1.077 -1.209 -1.797 -0.103
(0.066)** (0.117)** (0.081)** (0.542)** (0.146)
Rank 4 -0.99 -1.08 -1.198 -1.56 -0.263
(0.053)** (0.099)** (0.068)** (0.505)** (0.120)*
Rank 5 -0.658 -0.926 -0.891 -0.471 -0.553
(0.054)** (0.102)** (0.068)** (0.58) (0.134)**
Rank 6 -0.743 -0.958 -0.872 -0.963 -0.558
(0.055)** (0.102)** (0.068)** (0.552) (0.139)**
Consumer Goods -0.021 -0.057 0.066 0.318 -0.152
(0.037) (0.111) (0.082) (0.265) (0.091)
Services 0.075 0.024 0.211 0.025 -0.001
(0.034)* -0.105 (0.078)** (0.22) (0.083)
Assets 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.000) -0.001 (0.000) (0.005) (0.001)
Employees 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.008 0.001
(0.000)** (0.001)* (0.001) (0.004)* (0.000)*
Observations 28443 17866 26708 757 30343
Standard errors in parentheses;* signi￿cant at 5%; ** signi￿cant at 1%









Executive Experience 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.001)
Tenure 0.011 0.04 0.018 0.000 -0.041
(0.001)** (0.004)** (0.002)** (0.011) (0.004)**
# of Executive Moves 0.059 0.101 0.063 -0.227 0.092
(0.014)** (0.035)** (0.018)** (0.111)* (0.037)*
# of past moves 0.016 0.058 0.01 0.095 -0.08
-0.011 (0.025)* (0.013) -0.083 (0.030)**
Age -0.107 -0.396 -0.139 0.008 0.185
(0.010)** (0.059)** (0.013)** (0.111) (0.041)**
Age Square 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.002
(0.000)** (0.001) (0.000)** (0.001) (0.000)**
Female 0.053 -0.041 -1.153 0.012
(0.071) (0.091) (0.483)* (0.198)
No. Degree -0.058 0.025 -0.562 0.181
(0.043) (0.057) (0.292) 0.105)
MBA -0.043 -0.075 -0.255 0.287
(0.037) (0.047) 0.235) (0.086)**
MSMA 0.008 0.043 0.212 -0.11
(0.037) (0.048) (0.26) (0.098)
Ph.D. -0.05 -0.04 -0.574 -0.031
(0.039) (0.05) (0.274)* (0.103)
Prof. Certi￿cation -0.151 (0.149) -0.538 -0.044
(0.036)** (0.046)** (0.253)* (0.094)
Turnover 2.14 3.173 2.314
(0.088)** (0.153)** (0.110)**
Constant 3.583 3.366 -8.038
(0.292)** (3.188) (1.150)**
Observations 28443 17866 26708 757 30343
Standard errors in parentheses;* signi￿cant at 5%; ** signi￿cant at 1%
in parentheses;* signi￿cant at 5%; ** signi￿cant at 1%
42Table 7: Multinominal Logit of Firm Choice
( Staying with your Current Firm in the Based)
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 Retirement
MBA -0.026 0.205 0.146 0.167 0.413 0.353 -0.049
(0.200) (0.181) (0.140) (0.230) (0.280) (0.161)* (0.036)
MS/MA -0.467 -0.727 -0.335 -0.145 -0.107 -0.207 -0.014
(0.225)* (0.238)** (0.164)* (0.240) (0.314) (0.192) (0.035)
PhD -0.787 -0.338 -0.316 -0.281 -0.371 -0.151 -0.080
(0.248)** (0.217) (0.168) (0.270) (0.363) (0.205) (0.037)*
No Degree -0.319 -0.436 -0.298 0.435 0.184 0.113 -0.118
(0.246) (0.242) (0.184) (0.254) (0.332) (0.204) (0.041)**
Moves befere Exec. -0.141 -0.265 -0.202 -0.046 -0.315 -0.377 0.045
(0.063)* (0.075)** (0.055)** (0.066) (0.107)** (0.073)** (0.010)**
Female 0.198 0.127 -0.242 -0.173 -1.410 -0.226 0.342
(0.365) (0.349) (0.328) (0.482) (1.021) (0.344) (0.073)**
Tenure -32.248 -32.149 -32.277 -31.894 -32.262 -31.935 0.010
(1.09e+6) (9.9e+5) (7.8e+5) (9.3e+5) (1.4e+5) (6.8e+5) (0.002)**
Moves after Exec. -0.024 -0.021 0.061 -0.108 -0.123 0.003 0.062
(0.052) (0.050) (0.035) (0.067) (0.086) (0.044) (0.010)**
Age 0.340 0.165 0.360 0.270 0.340 0.321 0.039
(0.105)** (0.075)* (0.083)** (0.130)* (0.173)* (0.101)** (0.009)**
Age square -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.000
(0.001)** (0.001) (0.001)** (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)** (0.000)*
Firm Type : 2 -0.197 0.650 0.463 -0.781 -0.303 -1.182 0.291
(0.219) (0.230)** (0.200)* (0.457) (0.473) (0.474)* (0.044)**
Firm Type : 3 -0.932 0.049 0.640 -1.097 -1.378 -0.262 0.232
(0.210)** (0.223) (0.175)** (0.407)** (0.516)** (0.298) (0.038)**
Firm Type : 4 -1.500 -1.058 -1.096 2.048 1.587 1.452 0.673
(0.476)** (0.538)* (0.441)* (0.293)** (0.388)** (0.304)** (0.048)**
Firm Type : 5 -1.954 -1.316 -2.072 0.859 1.286 1.317 0.440
(0.603)** (0.613)* (0.728)** (0.383)* (0.426)** (0.319)** (0.060)**
Firm Type : 6 -1.743 -1.323 -0.729 0.846 0.573 1.828 0.339
(0.340)** (0.370)** (0.254)** (0.304)** (0.379) (0.254)** (0.044)**
Previous Rank :2 -1.064 0.083 0.059 -0.176 0.239 -0.277 -1.060
(0.422)* (0.455) (0.277) (0.649) (0.768) (0.278) (0.054)**
Previous Rank :3 0.186 0.810 0.535 1.170 1.478 0.065 -0.560
(0.454) (0.503) (0.308) (0.662) (0.802) (0.331) (0.069)**
Previous Rank :4 0.677 1.382 0.633 1.310 1.426 0.293 -0.340
(0.373) (0.435)** (0.267)* (0.606)* (0.742) (0.265) (0.048)**
Previous Rank : 5 0.857 1.134 0.391 1.746 1.329 -0.255 -0.340
(0.391)* (0.460)* (0.295) (0.611)** (0.765) (0.313) (0.052)**
Constant -12.389 -8.882 -12.618 -11.794 -14.162 -11.705 -2.918
(2.794)** (2.086)** (2.208)** (3.325)** (4.471)** (2.603)** (0.281)**
Observations 59066 59066 59066 59066 59066 59066 35019
43Table 8 : Multinominal Logit of Rank Choice (Rank 4 is excluded )
variables 1 2 3 5
MBA 0.232 0.232 0.011 -0.021
(0.082)** (0.067)** (0.069) (0.062)
MS/MA -0.011 -0.131 -0.117 0.014
(0.089) (0.073) (0.075) (0.061)
PhD -0.117 -0.094 -0.147 0.187
(0.094) (0.076) (0.079) (0.060)**
No Degree 0.198 0.142 0.144 -0.086
(0.091)* (0.075) (0.075) (0.070)
Moves befere Exec. -0.144 -0.169 -0.117 0.038
(0.028)** (0.023)** (0.023)** (0.017)*
Female -0.749 -0.608 -0.435 0.220
(0.214)** (0.162)** (0.152)** (0.106)*
Tenure -0.002 -0.008 -0.006 0.001
(0.004) (0.003)** (0.003)* (0.003)
Moves after Exec. -0.008 -0.019 -0.048 0.013
(0.026) (0.022) (0.023)* (0.019)
Age 0.156 0.226 0.060 -0.009
(0.025)** (0.024)** (0.022)** (0.015)
Age square -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.000
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)
Firm Type : 2 0.077 0.193 0.084 -0.224
(0.104) (0.086)* (0.088) (0.073)**
Firm Type : 3 0.283 0.352 0.216 -0.374
(0.089)** (0.075)** (0.076)** (0.067)**
Firm Type : 4 -0.585 -0.388 -0.324 0.020
(0.133)** (0.104)** (0.110)** (0.079)
Firm Type : 5 -0.262 -0.115 0.013 -0.152
(0.148) (0.118) (0.118) (0.099)
Firm Type : 6 0.239 0.195 0.191 -0.262
(0.103)* (0.086)* (0.087)* (0.077)**
Previous Rank :2 -2.196 3.745 -0.413 0.209
(0.132)** (0.144)** (0.177)* (0.296)
Previous Rank :3 -3.544 0.652 3.031 0.265
(0.159)** (0.154)** (0.162)** (0.309)
Previous Rank :4 -7.890 -4.656 -3.662 -1.951
(0.124)** (0.134)** (0.145)** (0.255)**
Previous Rank : 5 -7.181 -3.512 -2.402 3.922
(0.232)** (0.170)** (0.168)** (0.253)**
44Table 9: Structural Estimates and Simulations
￿2, ￿3 and ￿4 are measured in US100,000 of dollars
￿1 is measured in percentage per year



























￿4 4 14.0 18.9
5 18.2 22.7
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